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NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANcE-EFFECT OF
FOUR TO FOUR DECISIONS.-Josh Billings, the humorist, once said: "It
ain't what yer don't know thet hurts yer, so much ez knowin' sech a
lot o' things thet ain't so." One of the "things thet ain't so," which
quite a lot of people know today, is that the Supreme Court of the
United States has sustained the constitutionality of the New York
unemployment insurance law. The law was sustained in the case of
Chamberlin v. Anderson," by a vote of five to two. Certiorari to the
United States Supreme Court was granted,2 but the Supreme Court
failed by a vote of four to four, to reach any decision.3
Before proceeding to discuss the legal effect of that four to four
vote, I should like briefly to distinguish between the two forms of
unemployment benefit legislation in vogue in this country. The "em-
ployer reserve" type prevails in Indiana, Kentucky, Oregon, Vermont
and Wisconsin. Under this type, each employer maintains a separate
account with the state fund. His contributions are used to provide
benefits for his own employes and ex-employes alone, and cannot be
used to subsidize the irregular operations of his competitors. In Wis-
consin, when an employer's account reaches 7.5 per cent of his pay-
roll, his contribution rate drops from 2.7 per cent to 1 per cent of
his payroll, and when his account reaches 10 per cent, his contribu-
tions cease.4 The other states have a somewhat similar scaling-down.
Sections 909 and 910 of the Federal Social Security Act' recognize
this type of law, by allowing this saving, in addition to the actual con-
tributions paid, to be set off against the federal payroll tax. Advocates
of this type of legislation claim that, insofar as unemployment is pre-
ventable, this type tends to prevent it by offering a direct inducement
to stabilization, and that, insofar as unemployment is unpreventable,
this type of law is socially sound by making the cost of this unemploy-
ment a part of the cost of the goods which require the maintenance of
an idle labor reservoir. The solvency of each individual account
(except possibly in Vermont) is guaranteed by a reinsurance fund;
therefore no employe need fear to lose his benefits, even if the account
of his particular employer should become exhausted. Vermont attempts
to secure the same result by pooling the small and insecure accounts.
Secondly, there is the "pooled fund" type of law, in effect in Colo-
rado, Maine, Maryland, Mississippi, New York, North Carolina, Penn-
sylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Virginia. Under this type
all employers contribute to a single pooled fund at a fixed rate regard-
less of their respective unemployment experience; and this fund is
indiscriminately available to pay benefits to all employes. Obviously
such a law at best has no tendency whatever to reduce unemployment
or even to allocate its burden according to correct principles of social
cost accounting, and, at worst, may even increase unemployment.
Morally, to require one employer to subsidize the irregular operations
'271 N.Y. 1, 2 N.E. (2d) 22 (1936).
2298 U.S. 685, 56 Sup. Ct. 958, 80 Led. 1405 (1936).
-57 Sup. Ct. 122, 81 L.ed. 69 (1936).
4 WIs. STAT. (1935) § 108.18.
549 STAT. 643, 644 (1935), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1109, 1110 (1936).
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of a competitor is indistinguishable from requiring one employer to
make up a deficiency in the low wages paid by a competitor. In this
respect the pooled fund laws probably violate the principles laid down
by the United States Supreme Court in the Railway Pension Cases."
The only argument offered in favor of a pooled fund law is that
it affords greater certainty of benefits to all employes; but, as already
seen above, this argument is not plausible, inasmuch as equal security
is furnished by the reinsurance fund which is common to all reserve
type laws thus far enacted, except possibly Vermont. The laws of
Alabama, District of Columbia, and Massachusetts and Montana are
of the pooled fund type, plus a rather indefinite authorization of merit
rating at some remote future date.
The laws of Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Idaho,
Iowa, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Ten-
nessee, Texas, Utah and West Virginia, although of the pooled fund
type, really ought to be classed as almost being employer reserve laws,
inasmuch as they definitely provide for merit rating on exactly the
same basis as though the accounts of the several employers were not
merged. This intermediate type is generally know as the "New Hamp-
shire type," having originated there.
In addition to the New York case already referred to, pooled fund
laws have been held invalid in Alabama7 and valid in Massachusetts.8
A law of the New Hampshire type has been sustained in CaliforniaY
Reverting now to the situation in the United States Supreme Court,
we find a very interesting complete parallel in the litigation over the
proper interpretation to be given to Sections 29 and 30 of the War
Revenue Act of July 1, 1898. Those sections imposed a tax on lega-
cies, which tax was to become due and payable one year after the
death of the testator. They were repealed, effective July 1, 1902, and
the question was as to whether the tax could be collected in the case
of a testator who died within one year prior to that date. In" Eidman v.
Tilghman'0 the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit an-
swered this question in the negative. Certiorari was granted by the
United States Supreme Court which sustained the court below by an
equally divided vote." The Circuit Court of Appeals of the Third Cir-
cuit held the same in McCoach v. Philadelphia Trust, etc. Co.32 and in
McCoach v. Norris. 3 Certiorari was granted in these three cases, they
were argued together, and the court below was sustained by an equally
divided vote.' 4
In a fifth case, United States v. Marion,1 the Circuit Court of
Appeals of the Seventh Circuit went even further, and held that, if the
' Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton R. R., 295 U.S. 330, 357, 55 Sup. Ct. 758,
79 L.ed. 1468, 1480 (1935).
I Southern Coal & Coke Co. v. Carmichael, 17 F. Supp. 225 (D. Ala. 1936).
s Howes Bros. Co. v. Commission, (Mass. 1937) 5 N.E. (2d) 720.
!Gillum v. Johnson, (Cal. 1936) 62 P. (2d) 1037.
'I 136 Fed. 141 (C.C.A. 2d, 1905).
"I Eidman v. Tilghman, 203 U.S. 580, 27 Sup. Ct. 779, 51 L.ed. 326 (1906).
12142 Fed. 120 -(C.C.A. 3d, 1905).
'3 142 Fed. 120 (C.C.A. 3d, 1905).
24 McCoach v. Philadelphia Trust Safe Deposit & Insurance Co., 205 U.S. 539,
27 Sup. Ct. 793, 51 L.ed. 921 (1907).
I5 143 Fed. 301 (C.C.A. 7th, 1906).
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testator died more than a year before the repeal of the Act, yet if the
assessment of the tax was still in litigation at the date of repeal, it was
wiped out. Certiorari was granted and the case was argued with the
McCoach cases. The court below was sustained by an equally divided
vote.1' By that time the Supreme Court must have tired of its inability
to agree upon this question, or even to decide it. For when the Circuit
Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Stephen-
son, an unreported case, and the Circuit Court of Appeals of the First
Circuit in Kinney v. Conant,7 held the same way, the Supreme Court
refused to grant petitions for certiorari.ls However, the Circuit Court
of Appeals of the Eighth Circuit decided the question the other way.'9
If one is ever justified in assuming, from equally divided decisions
and/or refusals to grant certiorari, that the United States Supreme
Court is in accord with the nearly unanimous decisions of courts below,
this would have been the situation calling for such an assumption. For
here was a point of law on which the Supreme Court by an equal divi-
sion on two separate occasions had let stand the decisions of the courts
below in five separate cases, and on which thereafter they had twice
refused certiorari. But, in the face of these apparently insuperable
odds, the Collectors of Internal Revenue persisted, and persuaded the
Circuit Court of Apeals of the Seventh Circuit to certify the question
to the Supreme Court. Whereupon the Supreme Court decided the
question exactly the other way.20 The taxpayer raised the defense that,
in the first place, the circuit court of appeals ought not to have asked
instructions, having definitely decided the question three times itself;
and that, in the second place, the Supreme Court had repeatedly
decided the question by sustaining the courts below by four to four
decisions, and hence the matter was stare decisis.
This decision did not constitute a reversal of position by the
Supreme Court, as Justice Lurton was careful to point out in his
opinion, saying:
"Under the precedents of this court, and as seems justified by rea-
son as well as by authority, an affirmance by an equally divided court
is as between the parties a conclusive determination and adjudication
of the matter adjudged, but the principles of law involved not having
been agreed upon by a majority of the court sitting, prevents the case
from becoming an authority for the determination of other cases,
either in this or in inferior courts. [italics mine]. The affirmance by a
divided court in the second case shows this, for if it was not so the sec-
ond equal division could not have happened, for the case would have
been controlled by the first equal division.
"We shall therefore proceed to determine the question of law pre-
sented by the certificate of the Circuit Court of Appeals, feeling free
to decide it as our judgments may dictate."'
16 United States v. Marion Trust Co., 206 U.S. 566, 27 Sup. Ct. 794, 51 L.ed.
1191 (1907).
11 166 Fed. 720 (C.C.A. 1st, 1909).
Is United States v. Stephenson, 212 U.S. 572 (1908) ; Kinney v. Conant, 214 U.S.
526, 29 Sup. Ct. 703, 53 L.ed. 1068 (1909).
19 164 Fed. 795 (C.C.A. 8th, 1908).2 0 Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U.S. 205, 30 Sup. Ct. 621, 54 L.ed. 1001 (1910).
- Hertz v. Woodman, note 20, supra, at 213, 214. The citations in Hertz v.
Woodman, of the earlier cases in this comedy of errors are so full of mis-
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Accordingly the recent sustention of the New York pooled fund un-
employment insurance act goes no higher than the decision of the
Court of Appeals of that state, and the situation is just as though
the United States Supreme Court had never granted certiorari-in
fact as though certiorari had never even been applied for. This fact
was fully appreciated by the statutory three-judge federal court which
unanimously held that the almost identical Alabama act violates both
the state and the federal constitutions, and refused to pay any atten-
tion to the New York decision.2 2 This Alabama case is now before the
United States Supreme Court on appeal. Accordingly the score now
stands on pooled fund laws: New York's law sustained by the Court
of Appeals of that state by a five to two vote, Alabama's law declared
unconstitutional unanimously by a three-judge federal court and
appealed to the United States Supreme Court, the Massachusetts law
declared constitutional by the Supreme Judicial Court of that state,
and certiorari denied, no action whatever as yet by the Supreme Court
of the United States. No reserve-type law has yet been even questioned
in the courts; but in California a quasi-reserve type, i. e. "New Hamp-
shire type," law has been sustained.
ROGER SHERMAN HOAR.
LOTTERIEs-"BANK-NIGHT"-CONSIDERATION FOR CHANCE.-Ad-
vertising schemes such as "bank-night," "Hollywood," "country-store"
and the like, have been challenged in both criminal and civil proceed-
ings as lotteries. Generally a lottery is defined as a device for the dis-
tribution of prizes by chance.' More specifically it is a scheme for the
disposal or distribution of property by chance among persons who have
paid, or promised or agreed to pay, any valuable consideration for the
chance of obtaining such property.2 Three necessary elements will at
once be distinguished, first, the giving away of property, second,
chance, and third, consideration for the chance.3
Although the first two elements are usually found in the "bank-
night" cases, the third element of consideration has caused the courts
to follow diverging paths. It is certainly permissible for a theater to
present its patrons with gifts in appreciation of attendance, and it
would seem that it should make little difference that such a distribu-
tion of gifts is made to depend on chance. But once a consideration is
paid for the chance, the whole scheme is a lottery. Neither the Wis-
consin4 nor federal statutes5 define a lottery, although both have pro-
prints, as to render it very difficult to trace the history of the situation. This
present article employs corrected citations.
22 Southern Coal & Coke Co. v. Carmichael, 17 F. Supp. 225 (D. Ala. 1936).
1 BouviER, LAW DIc'noNARx (8th ed. 1914).
2 BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY, (3d ed. 1933).
3 State v. Hundling, 220 Iowa 1369, 264 N.W. 608 (1936).
4Wxs. CONST. art. IV, § 24; Wis. STAT. (1935) § 348.01 (setting up or pro-
moting a lottery), § 348.02 (selling tickets for a lottery), § 348.03 (advertising
tickets), M 348.04, 348.05 (fictitious lottery), § 348.06 (prizes forfeited to the
state).
5 17 STAT. 294, 302 (1872), 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 336, 337 (1927) ; 28 STAT. 963 (1895),
18 U.S.C.A. 387 (1927).
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